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MANAGEMENT EARNINGS GUIDANCE AND STOCK PRICE CRASH RISK 
Abstract 
Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (JFE 2009) show that more transparent financial reporting of 
earnings reduces the likelihood of a future stock price crash. We extend their work by examining 
how management earnings guidance is related to such crash risk. Accounting for endogeneity in 
guidance decisions, we find that higher annual guidance frequency is associated with higher 
crash risk, which contrasts with the notion that more guidance enhances transparency and 
reduces crash risk. Consistent with agency problems being an explanation, we find that the 
positive association is stronger for firms with higher executive stock ownership, weaker external 
monitoring, lower litigation risk, more upward-biased forecasts, and more opaque earnings. We 
also show that the association is weaker after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, consistent with the act 
curbing agency problems. A key implication of our findings is that more guidance does not 
necessarily lead to better capital market outcomes. 
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MANAGEMENT EARNINGS GUIDANCE AND STOCK PRICE CRASH RISK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A series of corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) and the recent financial crisis 
have led regulators, practitioners, and researchers to investigate the cause of extreme price 
declines. In her testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on January 14, 2010, 
SEC chairman Mary Schapiro contended that “[a] central question ... is whether investors 
received timely and accurate disclosure concerning deteriorating business conditions.” In an 
important recent study, Hutton et al. (2009, hereafter HMT) show that opaque earnings are 
associated with higher stock price crash risk; they conclude that transparent financial reporting is 
important for stability in capital markets. Apart from mandatory earnings reports, many firms 
also provide earnings guidance (Hirst et al. 2008). Beyer et al. (2010), in assessing the relative 
importance of various corporate disclosures on stock return variance, estimate that guidance 
accounts for 66% of the total variance explained by accounting-based disclosures, compared to 
12% from mandatory disclosures (i.e., earnings releases and SEC filings). Hence, a natural 
extension of HMT is to examine how earnings guidance is related to stock price crash risk.  
The early literature typically regards guidance as a mechanism that allows managers to 
convey their private information to outsiders. For example, a series of studies find that guidance 
helps move investor expectations closer to management beliefs, especially when there is bad 
news (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Matsumoto 2002; Skinner 1994). Issuing 
guidance helps reduce information asymmetry and the cost of raising capital (Coller and Yohn 
1997; Frankel et al. 1995), while discontinuing guidance results in a deteriorating information 
environment (Chen et al. 2011). Besides the informational role, guidance allows for better 
monitoring and reduces managers’ incentives to shirk or engage in value-destroying behaviors 2 
 
(Bushman and Smith 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; Nagar et al. 2003). Given that these studies 
all support the idea that guidance-providing firms are more transparent, one might expect that 
more guidance would reduce the likelihood of a stock price crash, as does more transparent 
financial reporting (HMT).  
The premise underlying this typical view is that managers truthfully reveal private 
information through guidance. However, there are increasing concerns about the potential 
agency problems associated with guidance, due to its voluntary and non-audited nature (Core 
2001; Healy and Palepu 2001).
1 A recent report by McKinsey & Company (2006) contends that 
the practice of guidance has become “misguided” due to an excessive focus on short term 
“number games” rather than long term business conditions. This myopic focus could induce 
managers to sugarcoat poor business conditions with misleading guidance, which leads to further 
opportunistic behaviors (e.g., earnings management to meet or beat the guidance) (Deloitte and 
FERF 2009; Kasznik 1999; CFA Institute 2006; Lev 2011). Managers could rely on guidance to 
create an illusion of stability and gamble on improvements in business conditions (Graham et al. 
2005; Kothari et al. 2009). A number of studies echo this criticism by showing that managers use 
earnings guidance to manipulate the beliefs of analysts and investors for opportunistic purposes 
(Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Amel-Zadeh et al. 2012; Bergman and Roychowdhury 2008; Cheng 
and Lo 2006; Cotter et al. 2006; Feng et al. 2012; Noe 1999; Rees et al. 2009; Shroff et al. 
2012).
2 Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) also present a model in which managers could exploit 
                                                 
1 Recent interviews and surveys of managers by Graham et al. (2005) and Dichev et al. (2012) indicate that a 
significant number of managers are willing to manage earnings (typically upwards) to misrepresent economic 
performance, even at the cost of destroying firm value. One reason is that managers strongly believe that such 
misrepresentation “will likely go undetected” (Dichev et al. 2012). Given the agency problems with reporting 
earnings, one might expect similar issues to be present with guidance, especially since guidance is voluntary and 
non-audited. 
2 For example, Amel-Zadeh et al. (2012) find that acquiring firms issue upward biased guidance more frequently, 
and by doing so, they receive a better stock market reaction on the announcement, get higher bids and better contract 
terms, and have higher likelihoods of deal completion. 3 
 
disclosures for career concerns. Finally, Libby and Rennekamp (2012) provide evidence that the 
issuance of forecasts is associated with a self-serving attribution bias and overconfidence. In sum, 
recent studies have highlighted the concerns of various stakeholders about guidance credibility, 
especially since stakeholders cannot perfectly unravel biases in guidance (Hutton et al. 2003; 
Rogers and Stocken 2005; Young 2006).  
Taken together, the relation between management earnings guidance and stock price 
crashes appears to be an empirical issue. On one hand, guidance could reduce crash risk because 
it conveys useful information that forewarns the capital markets of firm-specific declining 
business conditions. As noted in Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), the literature typically equates 
more disclosure with higher quality disclosure. To the extent that more guidance is associated 
with higher transparency, one might rely on HMT’s finding to conclude that more guidance 
would lower the crash risk. On the other hand, to the extent that guidance is used 
opportunistically to hoard bad news, it could increase the likelihood of a price crash (Benmelech 
et al. 2010; Bleck and Liu 2007; Jin and Myers 2006).
3 Both effects are likely to be present; the 
purpose of our study is to examine empirically which effect, on average, dominates when it 
comes to stock price crashes, significant economic events that are likely associated with serious 
agency problems.  
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 43,006 firm-years from 1997 to 2009. We 
find a positive association between annual guidance and crash risk. An economic significance 
analysis indicates that the effect of guidance on crash risk is comparable to that of financial 
                                                 
3 United States v. Nacchio (No. 07-1311, March 17, 2008) provides an illustration. In September 2000, Qwest’s 
CEO, Joseph Nacchio, issued an annual revenue forecast of $21.3 to $21.7 billion for fiscal year 2001 despite being 
aware of an internal memo hinting that the revenue would be a disappointing $20.4 billion or even worse. This 
guidance was reaffirmed several times between September 2000 and May 2001. When the bad news was finally 
revealed in June 2001, Qwest’s stock price plunged about 21% in two weeks. Nacchio was later convicted of insider 
trading because he exercised his stock options and sold shares at prices that were inflated by the guidance. 4 
 
reporting opacity (HMT). We recognize that guidance decisions, similar to financial reporting 
opacity, are endogenous. We use two common identification strategies to control for the 
potential endogeneity and find that our result is not solely driven by endogeneity.  
Our first strategy is to use Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) as an 
instrumental variable in examining the effect of guidance frequency on stock price crash risk. 
The SEC adopted Reg FD to ban selective disclosures and boost confidence in capital markets. 
Prior research finds increased guidance frequency after Reg FD when managers substitute 
selective disclosures with public guidance (Bailey et al. 2003; Heflin et al. 2003). We consider 
Reg FD to be a good instrument to guidance because “leveling the playing field” among 
investors is unlikely to directly increase the likelihood of future crashes (Larcker and Rusticus 
2010).
4 The results from our instrumental variable approach suggest that firms that provide more 
guidance are more likely to suffer from subsequent stock price crashes.  
Our second strategy is to exploit the cross-sectional or time-series variation in the 
severity of agency problems. We hypothesize that more severe agency problems increase 
managers’ incentive to opportunistically guide market expectations, leading to a stronger relation 
between guidance frequency and crash risk. Consistent with this rationale, we find that guidance 
frequency has a stronger positive association with crash risk in firms with higher CEO stock 
ownership. The association is attenuated in firms with greater external monitoring from financial 
analysts or with higher litigation risk. We also find a weaker association after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX), consistent with SOX curtailing fraudulent reporting behaviors by imposing a 
higher litigation risk on managers. As opaque financial reporting reflects potential agency 
problems (HMT), we show that opacity in financial reporting reinforces the effect of guidance on 
                                                 
4 On the contrary, Kothari et al. (2009) provides evidence that firms have reduced the extent of bad news 
withholding relative to good news after Reg FD, which implies that Reg FD may have indirectly decreased crash 
risk. This speaks to the strength of Reg FD as our instrumental variable. 5 
 
crash risk. We further show that the positive correlation between guidance frequency and crash 
risk is stronger when management forecasts are more upward biased, consistent with managers 
issuing biased forecasts to manipulate market expectations. 
Finally, as a sensitivity test, we control for the contemporaneous stock price crash and 
demonstrate that the positive association between guidance frequency and stock price crash risk 
is not a manifestation of the continuation of crashes that occur as managers attempt to guide 
investors’ expectations downwards via a series of earnings forecasts. To address the concern 
about serial correlation in forecasting, we control for short term forecasts that are realized in the 
current year. We find that only those forecasts that are to be realized in future years drive future 
crashes. This evidence suggests that managers use mostly long-horizon forecasts for bad news 
hoarding. We also control for preexisting analyst forecast optimism before guidance and 
continue to find a significant positive association between guidance and crash risk. Finally, to 
address the concern that guidance simply increases future return volatility, we show that there is 
no significant correlation between guidance frequency and future stock price jumps. Hence, the 
positive association between guidance and crash risk is more consistent with bad news hoarding 
via guidance and subsequent price correction upon the revelation of the stockpiled bad news. 
By providing in-depth analyses of the relation between guidance frequency and crash 
risk, our paper fills a gap in the crash risk and earnings guidance literatures. In particular, while 
there is evidence in HMT that more opaque mandatory disclosure is associated with higher crash 
risk, it is unclear how a voluntary disclosure mechanism such as earnings guidance is associated 
with such risk. A review of the prior management forecast literature reveals that, with a few 
exceptions focusing on agency problems arising from earnings guidance, most studies find that 
more guidance is associated with desirable capital market attributes such as improved stock 6 
 
liquidity and a lower cost of capital. Our study, however, supports Hermalin and Weisbach’s 
(2012) prediction that agency problems could lead managers to use more disclosure to distort 
investors’ beliefs. Our findings of the managers’ opportunistic use of guidance and higher crash 
risk are also in line with Kothari et al. (2009) who find that, on average, managers systematically 
delay disclosing bad news to investors. On a broader note, a key implication of our study is that 
it is important to recognize the agency problem in corporate disclosure, especially if the 
disclosures are voluntary and/or non-audited.  
Nevertheless, we caution that our findings should not be interpreted as suggesting that 
management guidance is unconditionally opportunistic on average. Instead, our results indicate 
that conditional on the existence of significant agency problems, guidance could be used more 
opportunistically and could contribute to the extreme negative capital market consequences.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature 
and develop our hypothesis. In section 3, we describe the research design. We present our 
empirical analysis in section 4. We then conclude in the last section.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Beginning with Jin and Myers (2006), researchers have been concerned about whether 
the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, coupled with managers’ self-
interest, could be related to stock price crash risk. As Taleb (2007) indicates, a good 
understanding of these extreme outcomes can offer valuable insight into the true nature of the 
phenomena. The recent literature on crash risk argues that a stock price crash occurs when 
investors realize that stock prices have been (severely) inflated and that the occurrence of a crash 7 
 
would be an indicator of prior agency problems.
5  
To explore the precise nature of the agency problems, recent studies have investigated 
how crashes arise from managers’ bad news hoarding, which could be induced by equity-based 
compensation (Kim et al. 2011a), facilitated by opaque financial reporting (HMT; Jin and Myers 
2006) or corporate tax avoidance (Kim et al. 2011b), and left unconstrained from a lack of 
auditor monitoring (Callen and Fang 2011). In particular, HMT demonstrate that poor accruals 
quality in reported earnings allows managers to conceal bad news, which leads to future price 
crashes. Despite these efforts, the bad news hoarding mechanisms examined to date have largely 
been confined to opacity within the mandatory reporting system. It is unclear how other 
corporate disclosures (e.g., management guidance) play a role in this process. 
Traditional disclosure theory typically focuses on the information role of disclosure and 
predicts that increased levels of disclosure will lead to better capital market outcomes (e.g., 
lower information asymmetry) (Verrecchia 2001). As noted by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), the 
theory is “sufficiently broad as to allow the notion of ‘increased levels of disclosure’ to be 
interpreted as either an increase in the quantity of disclosure or an increase in the quality of 
disclosure (or both).” In line with traditional disclosure theory, Ajinkya and Gift (1984) posit that 
managers issue guidance to narrow the gap between managers’ and investors’ expectations about 
future earnings. A series of studies have provided evidence in support of the expectations 
adjustment hypothesis (e.g., Hassell and Jennings 1986; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Matsumoto 
2002). Consistent with guidance reducing information asymmetry, Coller and Yohn (1997) find 
that bid-ask spreads decrease after guidance is issued. Frankel et al. (1995) provide further 
evidence that managers issue more guidance before accessing capital markets, to obtain better 
                                                 
5 While recent research has focused on the agency problems that lead to extreme price declines, the early literature 
has examined a few equity market-based explanations for price crashes (e.g., Chen et al. 2001; French et al. 1987; 
Hong and Stein 2003; Romer 1993). 8 
 
terms (e.g., to lower the costs of raising capital). There is also evidence that once firms stop 
providing guidance, their information environment deteriorates as analyst forecast dispersion 
widens and analyst forecast error increases (Chen et al. 2011; Houston et al. 2010). Besides 
adjusting investors’ expectations, the information contained within earnings guidance also allows 
for better monitoring and reduces managers’ incentives to shirk or engage in value-destroying 
behaviors (Bushman and Smith 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; Nagar et al. 2003).  
Healy and Palepu (2001), however, caution that “the extent to which voluntary disclosure 
mitigates resource misallocation in the capital market depends on the degree of credibility of 
information ... Because managers have incentives to make self-serving voluntary disclosures, it is 
unclear whether management disclosures are credible.” Further, Core (2001) notes that, in 
addition to the informational role of disclosure, it is important to jointly consider managers’ 
incentives and corporate governance structure to understand firms’ optimal disclosure policies 
and their enforcement of them. More recently, theories have relaxed the assumption of truthful 
disclosure and have assumed that (at least some) managers have incentives to provide biased 
disclosure. For example, Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) demonstrate that managers have 
incentives to bias reporting if there is sufficient uncertainty about their reporting objectives. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) also predict that career concerns (i.e., job security or 
compensation) would induce managers to opportunistically distort disclosure if they are to be 
evaluated against such disclosures.  
A stream of empirical research has studied opportunism in guidance in two ways. First, 
there is evidence that managers use guidance to distort investors’ beliefs. Rogers and Stocken 
(2005) find that managers issue biased earnings forecasts when it is difficult for the market to 
detect misrepresentation. Several other studies show that managers issue more pessimistic or bad 9 
 
news guidance before executive stock option awards or insider purchases to maximize the payoff 
(Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Cheng and Lo 2006; Rees et al. 2009). Bergman and Roychowdhury 
(2008) provide evidence that managers use guidance to maintain optimistic earnings valuations, 
especially in times of low investor sentiment. In addition, Shroff et al. (2012) find that managers 
use guidance to artificially inflate stock prices before seasoned equity offerings. Feng et al. 
(2012) further show that firms engaging in accounting manipulations use guidance to delay these 
manipulations’ detection.  
Second, prior studies demonstrate that investors have concerns about the credibility of 
management forecasts. Hutton et al. (2003) find that bad news earnings forecasts are always 
informative but that good news forecasts are informative only when supplemented by verifiable 
forward-looking statements that bolster their credibility. Rogers and Stocken (2005) also find a 
stronger investor response to good news relative to bad news forecasts, consistent with the notion 
that investors tend to suspect an upward misrepresentation in guidance (Dichev et al. 2012; 
Graham et al. 2005). 
Taken together, prior research on management earnings guidance shows the two opposite 
roles that guidance plays: an information/governance role and an opportunistic role. These two 
roles create significant tension in how guidance is related to crash risk.  
If the information and/or governance role of guidance prevails, we would expect a 
negative association between the practice of issuing guidance and crash risk, for two reasons. 
First, more guidance reduces managers’ information advantage regarding a declining business 
condition, thereby making it difficult for managers to hide and stockpile bad news. Second, as 
guidance provides more “snapshots” of a firm’s operational condition and allows for better 
investor monitoring, it reduces managers’ incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviors. In 10 
 
contrast, if the opportunistic role of guidance dominates under the circumstance of declining 
business conditions, we would expect a positive association between guidance and crash risk for 
several reasons.  
First, career concerns could induce managers to issue biased forecasts to camouflage bad 
news (Hermalin and Weisbach 2012). Kothari et al. (2009) argue that managers face asymmetric 
payoffs in disclosure because good news increases compensation and extends their tenure, 
whereas bad news could lead to reduced compensation, a quick termination of employment, and 
a tarnished reputation in labor markets. Consequently, managers have incentives to issue 
misleading guidance and to hoard bad news in the hope that their firm’s business condition will 
improve enough to nullify the need to ever report the bad news (Graham et al. 2005). The 
agency-based model in Jin and Myers (2006) predicts the following link between opacity and 
crash risk. Self-interested managers have incentives to hide bad news about cash flow 
innovations because their informational advantage allows them to exploit shareholders. Opacity 
about firm operation helps managers conceal information. When the news is negative, managers 
would personally absorb losses and conceal the bad news to keep their jobs. However, when the 
accumulated losses become excessive, they exercise the abandonment option and reveal the 
accumulated bad news all at once, leading to extreme price declines. While the related analytical 
works (i.e., Benmelech et al. 2010; Bleck and Liu 2007) use different models and settings, the 
underlying themes are largely similar: managers have incentives to conceal bad news out of 
career concerns (i.e., job security or compensation); opacity allows managers to hoard bad news, 
which subsequently leads to a price crash. Even though these models are silent on the precise 
nature of the concealment, we conjecture that it could be accomplished in two ways: by 
abstaining from making truthful disclosures and/or by releasing misleading information to 11 
 
disguise the true conditions.  
Second, declining business conditions make guidance an effective means of distorting 
market expectations because the increased forecasting difficulty in a changing business condition 
reduces investors’ ability to detect forecast biases (Rogers and Stocken 2005). Third, managers’ 
opportunistic guiding behaviors cannot be completely deterred by the subsequent verification 
against realized values. Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate that significant contracting costs 
result in incomplete contracts and make it impossible to entirely eliminate agency problems. Due 
to high management turnover after a price crash (Gilson 1989) and the limited “clawback”, even 
if the guidance is bound to be later verified against realized values, it cannot completely 
discourage managers’ opportunistic guidance.
6  
In summary, there is significant tension in the hypothesis about the relation between 
guidance and stock price crash risk. The pure information and governance role of guidance 
suggests a negative association between guidance and a stock price crash, because such guidance 
moves investors’ expectations towards the “true” firm value and facilitates monitoring. In 
contrast, if guidance is used opportunistically to inflate stock prices via the concealment of bad 
news or by inflating investors’ earnings expectations, then there would be a positive association 
between guidance and crash risk. Therefore, our first hypothesis, stated in the null form, is:  
 H1: More guidance is not associated with a stock price crash risk.  
                                                 
6 A general concern about assuming the existence of opportunistic disclosure is that managers should ex-ante engage 
in truthful disclosure because of rational beliefs that the truth will be revealed in the future, and an extensive 
literature support that managers are, on average, not manipulative. Besides career concerns, other likely reasons 
include the notion that the optimal disclosure choice for shareholders is not always to be perfectly truthful because 
eliminating all manipulation can be too costly (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Lambert et al. 1991). Another 
possibility is that (some) managers are not completely rational (e.g., they are overconfident) and/or they believe that 
their misrepresentation will not be detected (Dichev et al. 2012; Libby and Rennekamp 2012). For example, Libby 
and Rennekamp (2012) find that managerial overconfidence contributes to the decision to issue earnings guidance; 
in particular, managers are likely to overestimate the extent to which they contribute to positive firm performance; 
both over-optimism about firm performance and overconfidence in their ability to predict future firm performance 
contribute to the issuance of earnings forecasts. 12 
 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Main Model 
To examine the association between crash risk and earnings guidance, we estimate the 
following probit regression:  
Crasht+1 (Jumpt+1) = β0 + β1 ROEt + β2 Sizet + β3 Market-to-bookt + β4 Leveraget  
+ β5 Abn_accrualst + β6 Business_segmentst + β7 Mean_returnt + β8 Std_returnt  
+ β9 Analystt + β10 Insider_tradingt + β11 Opacityt + β12 Opacity
2
t  
+ β13 Forecastt + εt+1,          (1) 
 
where Crash and Jump measure the risk of stock price crashes and jumps, respectively, in fiscal 
year  t+1. In particular, we follow HMT to use dummy variables Crash ( Jump) to capture 
whether extreme-negative (positive) stock return occur in any of the 52 weeks during year t+1. 
Appendix 1 provides detailed definitions for these two measures. Forecast, our key independent 
variable of interest, is the number of annual management earnings forecasts issued during fiscal 
year t and constructed from the First Call Company Issued Guidance database; we include all 
point and close-range forecasts of earnings-per-share.  
Figure 1 illustrates the timeline for measuring stock price crashes and earnings forecast 
frequency. We count annual forecasts made within year t so that, regardless of the forecasting 
period (i.e., fiscal year t or t+1), the realized value will be announced after the end of year t. This 
ensures that any bad news hoarding in guidance issued in year t would affect the likelihood of 
stock price crashes in future years rather than the current one. A positive (negative) coefficient 
on Forecast indicates that more forecasts are associated with the higher (lower) likelihood of a 
future extreme stock price movement. In untabulated sensitivity analyses, we find qualitatively 
similar results using variations of Forecast: i) the natural logarithm of the number of 
management earnings forecasts, ii) the number of days with at least one forecast over the course 13 
 
of the year, iii) a dummy variable equaling one if the firm has issued at least one forecast over 
the course of the year, and iv) the inclusion of open-range and qualitative forecasts. For purposes 
of parsimony, we only present the results with Forecast. 
We include two sets of control variables, all of which are measured as of fiscal year t. 
The first set of variables is chosen based on HMT. ROE is the net income before extraordinary 
items over the shareholders’ equity. Size is a log of the market value, and Market-to-Book is the 
ratio of the market value and the shareholders’ equity. Leverage is the ratio of the total liability 
over the total assets. Opacity, which is the key independent variable of interest in HMT, is the 
sum of the absolute abnormal accruals from year t-2 to year t, where abnormal accruals are 
estimated based on the cross-sectional modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995). 
As an alternative measure of opaque financial reporting, we use Accruals_quality, which is the 
standard deviation of five firm-specific residuals from a cross-sectional regression of accruals on 
the prior, current, and future cash flow from operations, as well as the changes in revenue and 
PP&E (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005; McNichols 2002). Unlike Opacity, which 
requires three years of data to compute, Accruals_quality requires seven years of data, and 
therefore is available only for a subsample.  
In addition, we control for another set of variables that could potentially lead to a bias in 
the coefficient on Forecast.
7 First, given that guidance can be related to the level of earnings 
management (Kasznik 1999), we control for upwards earnings management with abnormal 
accruals (Abn_Accruals), which is the residual of year t from the estimation of the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) accrual model.
8 Next, to mitigate concerns about the endogenous nature 
of guidance, we further include a number of determinants of the forecast frequency identified by 
                                                 
7 Our results are robust to limiting the set of control variables to those used in HMT. 
8 This is a regression model of accruals on sales growth and plant, property, and equity by industry in each year; we 
impose a requirement of at least 20 firms within each industry-year. 14 
 
Nagar et al. (2003). Business_segments is the number of business segments. We define 
Mean_return and Std_return as the mean and standard deviation of the weekly returns in year t. 
Mean_return is a proxy for firm performance that could affect both disclosures and changes in 
stock crash risk. Std_return  serves as a control for the increase in volatility upon guidance 
documented by Rogers et al. (2009). Analyst is the number of analysts following a firm reported 
in I/B/E/S. Insider_trading is the volume of insider trades divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. We control for analyst following and insider trading because prior studies have 
shown that such activities are associated with management forecasting behavior and capital 
market outcomes (Beyer et al. 2010). Finally, we further include year dummies (not shown). To 
deal with potentially inflated t-statistics due to the cross-sectional and time-series dependence of 
the residuals in a panel dataset, we cluster the standard errors by both firm and year (Petersen 
2009).  
Endogeneity in Guidance and Identification Strategies 
As noted earlier, guidance decisions, like financial reporting opacity, are endogenous and 
control variables are unlikely to completely account for the potential endogeneity. To provide 
further evidence of a causal link between guidance and stock price crash risk, we rely on two 
different identification strategies commonly used in the literature: i) the use of Reg FD as the 
instrumental variable for guidance frequency and ii) an examination of whether the positive 
association between guidance and crash risk is stronger under conditions where agency problems 
are more severe. We acknowledge that each identification strategy has its limitations, but hope 
that generally consistent results across the different approaches will enhance causal inferences.  
To implement the first strategy, we follow Newey (1987) and Foster (1997) to estimate a 
probit model with a continuous endogenous regressor. With the two-step procedure, we consider 15 
 
the following determinant model for guidance frequency as the first stage regression:
9  
Forecastt = β0 + β1 ROEt + β2 Sizet + β3 Market-to-bookt + β4 Leveraget  
+ β5 Abn_accrualst + β6 Business_segmentst + β7 Mean_returnt + β8 Std_returnt  
+ β9 Insider_tradingt + β10 Opacityt + β11 Opacity
2
t  
+ β12 RegFDt + εt.          (2) 
This model is largely based on Nagar et al. (2003). The dependent variable and most repressors 
are described in Section 3.1. RegFD is a dummy variable equaling one if the fiscal year t is after 
the effective date of Reg FD, zero otherwise. We use RegFD as an instrumental variable for 
Forecast for two reasons. First, prior research argues that Reg FD triggers a structural shift in 
corporate disclosure practices and there is evidence that managers substantially increase the 
frequency of public guidance to compensate for the selective disclosures prohibited after Reg FD 
(Bailey et al. 2003; Heflin et al. 2003). Second, the SEC adopted Reg FD to ensure that all 
investors would have equal access to material corporate disclosures, which would thereby boost 
investors’ confidence in capital markets. It is unlikely that Reg FD would have the direct effect 
of increasing the probability of future stock price crashes. In addition, Bushee et al. (2004) and 
Francis et al. (2006) show that firm disclosures, as well as the availability of public information, 
remain constant after Reg FD. Therefore, Reg FD is unlikely to indirectly influence future price 
crashes by reducing the amount of public information.  
Our second strategy is built on the rationale that more severe agency problems increase 
managers’ incentive to opportunistically guide market expectations, leading to a stronger relation 
between guidance frequency and crash risk. We exploit the cross-sectional variation in the 
severity of agency problems to identify the effect of guidance on crash risk. In particular, prior 
research argues that agency problems are likely to be more severe when there are higher equity 
incentives (Benmelech et al. 2010; Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Kim et al. 
                                                 
9 Given that our second-stage model (i.e., Eq. (1)) is non-linear, the conventional 2SLS method for instrumental 
variables will produce inconsistent estimates.  16 
 
2011b), when there is less external monitoring (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Moyer et al. 1989), 
and when managers are less concerned about litigation risk (Skinner 1994, 1997). Following 
Cheng and Warfield (2005), we use CEO stock ownership (CEO_own) as the proxy for equity-
based compensation. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that analysts play a monitoring role in 
limiting managerial opportunism. We use the number of analysts (Analyst) and institutional 
ownership % (Institution_own) to measure the intensity of external monitoring. To capture firms’ 
litigation risk, we use the probability of class action law suits (Lit_risk) estimated from Kim and 
Skinner’s (2012) model. We also consider a dummy variable for the post-SOX period (SOX) as 
an alternative measure for litigation risk because SOX has significantly increased the 
management litigation costs associated with fraudulent reporting (Cohen et al. 2008). Finally, 
given that opacity in financial reporting can reflect underlying agency problems (HMT), we use 
Opacity as an ex post measure for the severity of agency problems. In the same vein, the upward 
bias in forecasts (Up_bias) is considered management optimism and may be a sign of bad news 
hoarding. By adding these variables and their respective interactions with guidance frequency 
(Forecast) to Eq. (1), we expect positive coefficients on the interaction terms with CEO_own, 
Opacity, and Up_bias, but negative coefficients on the interaction terms with Analyst, 
Institution_own, Lit_risk, or SOX.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Sample Construction and Description 
To construct our sample, we start with all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ 
and then calculate the frequency of the earnings guidance using data from the First Call 
Company Issued Guidance database. Our sample begins in 1997, the first year for which the 17 
 
database provides comprehensive guidance coverage. The sample period extends to 2009 
because we have data through 2010 for computing the next year’s crash risk. To determine this, 
we use the firms’ weekly stock return data and the weekly industry and market returns from the 
CRSP database; more details of the crash risk measure can be found in Appendix 1. We obtain 
various control variables from the Compustat, I/B/E/S, and Thomson Reuters Insiders and 
Institutional (13f) Holdings databases. The final sample, constructed using firm-years with non-
missing variables, consists of 43,006 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 provides information about forecasters in our sample of 43,006 firm-years. In 
Panel A, we find that 6,726 of the firm-years have at least one annual earnings forecast during 
the year, and there is an upward trend in the percentage of forecasters. This trend is consistent 
with prior research findings (e.g., Rogers et al. 2009). Panel B provides preliminary evidence on 
the relation between guidance frequency and crash risk. Within each year, firms that provide 
guidance are categorized into two groups: low frequency and high frequency. While 18.51% of 
non-guider firm-years are followed by at least one crash during next year, the likelihood of a 
crash for guidance firm-years is significantly higher, at over 23%. Compared with those with no 
guidance, the percentage of firm-years with at least one crash in the next year is higher for high 
frequency guidance firm-years, by a statistically significant 7.09%. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our main analyses. The 
definitions of the variables are found in Appendix 1. Approximately 20% of our firm-years 
exhibit at least one crash in the next year. These percentages are largely consistent with HMT. 
The average number of annual forecasts (Forecast) per year is 0.738; note that for firms without 
any annual forecast over the course of the year, we set the number of forecasts to zero. The mean 
value of Opacity is 0.237, which is similar to that reported in HMT. In addition to Opacity, we 18 
 
include an alternative measure of reporting opacity, Accruals_quality, which is the accruals 
quality measured following Francis et al. (2005). Accruals_quality is available only for a subset 
of the sample because its computation requires a longer time-series of data.  
Stock Price Crash and Earnings Guidance 
Table 3 presents our main regression analyses on the relation between guidance and crash 
risk. We first report the probit regression estimates on Eq. (1). We find a significantly positive 
coefficient on Forecast (0.018), indicating that frequent forecasters are more likely to experience 
stock price crashes in the future. This finding is consistent with the notion that managers use 
guidance opportunistically to temporarily inflate stock prices, which leads to more crashes in the 
future. With regard to the control variables, we observe that Opacity has a significant positive 
coefficient (0.188), which confirms HMT’s finding of a positive association between financial 
reporting opacity and crash risk. Similar to HMT, we find a higher crash risk for larger firms. 
The finding that firms with more business segments (Business_segments) are associated with 
lower crash risk suggests that business diversification introduces some stability to the firm on the 
downside. The positive coefficient on Mean_return and the negative coefficient on Std_return 
indicate that firms with better stock performance and lower volatility are more likely to 
experience crashes in the future. These results indicate that crashes are unlikely to be a 
manifestation of declining business conditions, a continuation of poor stock performance (i.e., 
negative stock momentum), and/or high stock volatility. Instead, the results are consistent with 
the notion that crashes occur after a period of illusionary high prices and stability. In the second 
column, we use an alternative measure of opacity (Accruals_quality) and continue to find that 
more guidance is positively associated with Crash. Collectively, these findings indicate that there 
is a positive association between stock price crash risk and guidance, and this association is 19 
 
incremental to the findings of the positive association between stock price crash risk and 
financial reporting opacity in HMT. 
HMT estimate that a shift from the 25th to the 75th percentiles in the distribution of 
Opacity increases the crash risk by 1.56% (HMT, p.79). Using similar calculations, we find that 
the impact of a similar increase in Opacity is 0.63% in our sample period (untabulated).
10 We 
also calculate the marginal effects for the main regression in the first column to compare the 
economic impacts of Opacity vs. Forecast. In the third column, we document the economic 
effects of Opacity and Forecast to be 0.75% and 0.50%, respectively.
11 In sum, in our sample, 
the economic effect of management forecast frequency on crash risk is approximately two-thirds 
of that of mandatory reporting opacity.
  
Table 4 presents the results of our two-step probit regressions with RegFD as the 
instrumental variable for Forecast. The first column shows the results of the first stage 
regression on Eq. (2). The positive coefficient on RegFD (0.663) indicates that firms increase 
guidance frequency after the passage of Reg FD. Untabulated diagnostic tests provide some 
justification for the above instrumental variables approach. The Wald test for exogeneity has a 
Chi-square statistic of 86.19, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that guidance is exogenous. The 
partial R
2 is 0.034, suggesting that RegFD is a reasonable instrument. The F-statistic is 
statistically significant (F-stat = 85.78) and is above the rule of thumb of 10 proposed by Staiger 
and Stock (1997). It also satisfies the higher standard proposed by Stock et al. (2002): 
specifically, it is above the critical value of 19.93 based on the size of the nominal 5% Wald test.  
The second column presents the results of the second-stage regressions with Crash as the 
                                                 
10 The economic impact of opacity, 0.63%, is calculated as the difference between the likelihood of crash at the 75
th 
percentile of Opacity and Opacity
2 and the likelihood of crash at the 25
th percentile of Opacity and Opacity
2 at the 
averages of all other variables. 
11 For Forecast, the economic effect is calculated based on a shift from a zero forecast to a one, which corresponds 
to a shift from the 25
th to the 80th percentiles. 20 
 
dependent variable. A comparison of the result for the second-stage regression (0.220) and that 
of the plain probit regression (Table 3, 0.018) indicates that our result is not sensitive to the use 
of the instrumental variable research design (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). The coefficient on 
RegFD (0.063) is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The result indicates that the positive 
correlation between guidance frequency and crash risk is not purely driven by the endogeneity in 
guidance decisions.  
In sum, the results presented in Table 4 show that frequent forecasts are associated with a 
higher likelihood of a future stock price crash. The findings in HMT suggest that delayed 
revelation of bad news due to opaque financial reporting contributes to higher crash risk. While 
more earnings guidance might be considered as a mechanism via which a firm can be more 
transparent, which would result in lower crash risk, our results suggest otherwise. We find that 
firms that provide more guidance are also more likely to experience a future stock price crash. 
This evidence is consistent with the presence of agency problems in guidance practices that 
induce managers to use guidance to actively camouflage declining business conditions. 
An alternative explanation deserves further discussion. Namely, the effect of guidance on 
crash is contemporaneous (i.e., occur in the same year) and our finding of the positive 
association between guidance and the likelihood of a future crash is primarily due to a positive 
time-series correlation in the frequency of guidance. In other words, managers act faithfully in 
guidance practice and simply reveal bad news to the market in a future period in a timely manner 
when the bad news become observable to them, which instantly triggers a crash. This 
explanation is simply less convincing as there is no reason to believe that the odds of having 
significant bad news arrive in a future period should be any higher for firms generally issuing 
more guidance, unless we consider opportunism in the guidance practice.  21 
 
Severity of Agency Problems  
To further explore the notion that with the presence of agency problems guidance may be 
used opportunistically, we rely on a series of cross-sectional and time-series analyses and 
examine whether the positive association between frequent forecasts and crash risk varies 
systematically with the severity of agency problems.  
CEO Equity Ownership 
While extant research argues that granting equity to managers mitigates agency problems 
by aligning shareholders’ and managers’ interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen and 
Murphy 1990), more recent studies indicate that equity-based compensation could exacerbate 
agency problems. Specifically, the high sensitivity of management wealth to stock price induces 
managers to engage in short termist behavior to inflate the stock price at the cost of future firm 
value (Bolton et al. 2006). Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Burns and Kedia (2006) find 
evidence that higher CEO equity incentives are positively related to earnings management. 
Benmelech et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2011b), in particular, demonstrate that equity-based 
compensation provides higher incentives for managers to engage in bad news hoarding, which 
leads to higher crash risk. For this reason, it would be possible to expect managers with higher 
equity-based compensation to be more likely to use guidance to disguise bad news. Therefore, 
we predict that the association between frequent forecast and high crash risk would be stronger 
when CEO stock ownership is high.  
In the first column of Table 5, we report the results of regressions that examine how the 
relation between a stock price crash and the management forecast frequency varies with CEO 
stock ownership. We find a positive and significant coefficient of 0.038 on the interaction term 
between Forecast and CEO_own. The untabulated marginal impact of the interaction term is 22 
 
1.13% and significant, with a z-statistic of 4.08. This result suggests that managers with higher 
equity-based compensation are more likely to use guidance to disguise bad news and inflate 
stock prices.  
External Monitoring 
We use the number of analysts (Analyst) and institutional ownership % (Institution_own) 
to measure the intensity of external monitoring. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that analysts 
play a monitoring role in limiting managerial opportunism. Moreover, analysts can mitigate the 
effect of managerial guidance bias on market expectations by issuing their own corrective 
forecasts. Similarly, institutional investors have been identified as external monitors in various 
studies (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Bushee 1998, 2001) and also affect market expectations by their 
own trading activities. We examine whether this external monitoring plays a role in curbing 
managerial opportunism in guidance practice.  
The second column of Table 5 shows how external monitoring by analysts or institutional 
investors affects opportunistic guidance behavior. We find that firms with more analyst coverage 
mitigate the opportunism in guidance with a coefficient of -0.036 on the interaction term 
Forecast × Analyst. The untabulated marginal impact of the interaction term is -0.99% with a z-
statistic of -3.22.  On the contrary, we find that institutional investors’ role is limited. 
Litigation Risk 
  SEC Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for firms to either omit disclosure or to make an 
untrue statement of material facts. Firms that experience large negative returns are likely to be 
sued by investors if the investors believe that the managers knowingly withheld bad news. 
Skinner (1994) indicates that firms have incentives to disclose bad news through guidance before 
an earnings announcement to reduce future litigation risk. Providing guidance not only reduces 23 
 
the likelihood of getting sued (Field et al. 2005) and the aggregate recoverable damage (Skinner 
1997), it also limits managers’ personal liability in such suits. The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 potentially reduces concerns about litigation risk by providing a 
statutory safe harbor for forward-looking disclosures that are not realized later. As Young (2006) 
states, “[i]f plaintiff attorneys look at the reasons for the stock drop and determine that it is a 
result of missing guidance, they frequently won’t take the case.” Nevertheless, Rogers and 
Stocken (2005) find that managers of firms that face higher litigation risk tend to be less 
optimistic or more pessimistic, indicating that litigation risk can still attenuate managers’ 
incentives to engage in opportunistic earnings guidance. To the extent that firms are concerned 
about litigation risk when they provide guidance, the opportunistic use of guidance is expected to 
be mitigated. Hence, the positive association between the frequency of guidance and the crash 
risk is expected to be weaker when the litigation risk is high. Amel-Zadeh et al. (2012) document 
that acquirers issue upward biased guidance more frequently before merger & acquisition deals, 
but this behavior is mitigated when the risk of bidder litigation is high, which suggests that 
litigation risk plays an important role in curbing opportunism in guidance. 
To examine the role of litigation risk in the association between stock price crash and 
earnings guidance, we measure litigation risk (Lit_risk) as a firm-level class action litigation 
probability estimate predicted according to the model developed by Kim and Skinner (2012). 
The third column of Table 5 shows that the coefficient on the interaction term between Forecast 
and Lit_risk is -0.045 and statistically significant, which suggests that litigation risk reduces the 
opportunistic use of earnings guidance to inflate stock prices. The marginal impact of the 
interaction term (untabulated) is -1.23% and significant, with a z-statistic of -4.56.   
In untabulated analyses, we examine the associations between earnings guidance and 24 
 
crash risk in cases of low or high litigation risk. In other words, we focus on the main effect (i.e., 
coefficient on Forecast) as opposed to the interaction effect. We find that a positive association 
between earnings guidance and crash risk is present only when there is low litigation risk. Taken 
together, these results provide strong evidence that litigation risk plays an important role in 
reducing the agency problems associated with voluntary disclosure. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
We also examine how the association between a stock price crash and guidance varies 
with financial reporting. First, we focus on financial reporting opacity. Feng et al. (2012) 
hypothesize and find that when managers expect earnings to be manipulated or when they have 
already begun to misstate earnings, they are likely to adopt a coordinated earnings guidance 
strategy that would help conceal the manipulation, as its revelation is likely to impose substantial 
costs on both managers and their firms. To the extent that firms adopt a coordinated strategy of 
concealing bad news, we expect that when there are more opaque earnings (due to earnings 
manipulation), the positive association between guidance and crash risk is likely to be 
exacerbated. Second, we investigate the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). SOX reduces 
accruals manipulation via the imposition of higher litigation risk on managers for fraudulent 
reporting (Cohen et al. 2008). In a further examination of the positive association between stock 
price crash and financial reporting opacity, HMT finds that this association appears to have 
dissipated since the passage of SOX. They conclude that either earnings management has 
decreased or that firms can hide less information in the new regulatory environment. To the 
extent that SOX constrains managers’ ability to manipulate earnings to meet or beat prior 
earnings guidance, we expect the positive association between guidance and crash risk to be 25 
 
attenuated post SOX. 
12 
In the fourth column in Table 6, the coefficient on the interaction term between Forecast 
and SOX is -0.041 is statistically significant. The untabulated marginal impact of Forecast × SOX 
is -1.13% and significant, with a z-statistic of -3.32. These results indicate that the positive 
association between Forecast and Crash is smaller in the post-SOX period, and is consistent 
with the notion that more regulatory constraints lead to less opportunistic use of earnings 
guidance to distort investors’ beliefs.  
Opacity in Financial Reporting 
HMT identify opacity in financial reporting an important determinant of high crash risk. 
Assuming that opaque financial reporting is a diagnostic of underlying managerial opportunism 
and bad news hoarding, we consider Opacity as an ex post measure of severe agency problems. 
In the fifth column of Table 5, we report that the coefficient on the interaction term between 
Forecast and Opacity is 0.028 and statistically significant. The untabulated marginal impact of 
this interaction term (0.75%) is also highly significant, with a z-statistic of 3.7. This suggests that 
when there is more opaque financial reporting, the positive association between earnings 
guidance and crash risk is exacerbated.  
One alternative takeaway is that more transparent financial reporting is important for 
investors to see through any opportunism in management forecasting. Financial reports provide 
an important context for management forecasts, as they help investors determine whether such 
forecasts are realistic. Another related interpretation is that opacity in financial reporting alone is 
not enough for bad news hoarding. Only when opacity is accompanied by camouflaging 
                                                 
12 We acknowledge that one difficulty with examining the effect of SOX is the number of events in the time period 
before and after it (e.g., Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2001, Securities Offering Reform in 2005, and various 
accounting scandals). We examine the effect of SOX (as one of many different analyses) in our setting to facilitate 
comparison of our result and that in HMT, who examine the effect of SOX on the association between financial 
reporting opacity and crash risk.  26 
 
guidance that helps sustain investors’ (unwarrantedly high) expectations are managers able to 
accumulate more bad news, which leads to a price crash. 
Forecast Bias 
To further investigate our finding that frequent guidance can incur future crashes, we 
examine the forecast biases of these frequent forecasters. In particular, for the sample of 
forecasting firms, we construct an additional measure, Up_bias, which is a dummy variable 
equaling one if, on average, the management forecasts are upward biased compared to actual 
earnings.  
The last column of Table 5 reports how the cross-sectional variation in Up_bias affects 
the relation between forecast frequency and crash risk. Note that the sample size is significantly 
smaller because Up_bias is only available for forecasting firms and requires the actual 
corresponding earnings. We show that the positive association between Forecast and Crash is 
even stronger when forecasts are upwardly biased. This finding offers valuable insights into the 
underlying mechanism through which more guidance affects crash risk; the upwardly biased 
forecasts play a significant role in this phenomenon, as they could be indicative of managers’ 
opportunistically misleading investors and hoarding more bad news. The untabulated marginal 
impact is 0.83% and significant, with a z-statistic of 2.07.  
In summary, the results presented in this section provide consistent evidence that the 
positive correlation between guidance frequency and crash risk is more pronounced when agency 
problems are more severe. They support the view that opportunistic bad news hoarding in 
guidance practice are instrumental to the relation between guidance frequency and crash risk.  
Sensitivity Tests 
Contemporaneous Crash 27 
 
As a sensitivity test, we control for the contemporaneous stock price crash 
(Crash_currfyr). This test serves to examine a scenario in which managers guide investors 
expectations downward via a series of forecasts both in the current year and the next and these 
forecasts lead to a continuation of crashes over the two years. In this case, managers are 
considered to truthfully reveal bad news. In the first column of Table 6, we show that the 
positive relationship between Forecast and Crash is still significant after controlling for 
contemporaneous crashes.  
Forecasting Horizon 
We further investigate whether forecasting horizons matter. When managers 
opportunistically bias their forecasts upward, one would expect they are more likely to use 
longer term annual guidance and postpone the crashes to the next year because any biases in 
short term guidance are likely to be revealed shortly through earnings announcements. Long-
horizon annual forecasts, on the contrary, can be used to disguise bad news for a longer period 
and provide further impetus for earnings management to meet prior guidance. Therefore, these 
long term forecasts should be associated with greater agency problems and eventually lead to 
higher crash risk.  
In the second column of Table 6, we present the effects of the frequencies of long-
horizon and short-horizon annual earnings forecasts separately. We categorize forecasts as long-
horizon if they are for annual earnings that will be announced during the next fiscal year 
(timeline depicted in Figure 1). Forecasts on fiscal year t-1 earnings are classified as short-
horizon forecasts, as they are issued and shortly realized between the beginning of fiscal year t 
and the annual earnings announcement date for the fiscal year t-1 earnings. The frequency of the 
long-horizon forecasts is our main variable (Forecast), and the frequency of the short-horizon 28 
 
forecasts is additionally calculated as Forecast_currfyr. As predicted, we find no relationship 
between Forecast_currfyr and a future crash, suggesting that longer term forecasts are more 
plagued with agency problems and are therefore more likely to be used opportunistically. 
Optimism in Analyst Forecasts 
One valid alternative explanation of our findings is that forecasts are issued for the 
purpose of managing inflated analyst expectations down, and they incur crashes as a result. In 
the third column of Table 6, we show that analyst forecast bias (Analyst_optimism) is unrelated 
to future crashes, which suggests that analyst forecast bias are not the main determinants of our 
main findings.  
Jump Risk 
We repeat the earlier analyses using the stock price jump risk, Jump, as a dependent 
variable. The last column of Table 6 shows that there is no significant association between stock 
price jump and guidance. This finding has three implications. First, it suggests that managers’ 
guidance behaviors associated with extreme price movements in the future are directional; 
opportunistic guidance is, on average, upward biased in order to inflate stock prices. Second, the 
crashes that are associated with guidance are unlikely to be temporary plunges that will be soon 
reversed with jumps. Instead, they are likely to be downward price corrections due to the 
revelation that stock prices have been inflated. Finally, the evidence indicates that the higher 
crash risk associated with more guidance is not a mere manifestation of the increased volatility 
after guidance (Rogers et al. 2009). If volatility after guidance is the main determinants of 
crashes, the same volatility should also result in jumps. 
Taken together, our results support the notion that more guidance, unlike transparent 
financial reporting, may not necessarily be indicative of a more transparent disclosure that lowers 29 
 
crash risk. Instead, more guidance is associated with higher crash risk, especially with the 
presence of severe agency problems.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The relation between transparency and financial stability is an important issue and has 
attracted significant attention from academics and practitioners. The evidence in HMT indicates 
that more transparent financial reporting of earnings is associated with lower stock price crash 
risk. This mandatory reporting of earnings, however, is just one of the many disclosure 
mechanisms. In this paper, we study the relation between management earnings guidance, an 
important type of voluntary disclosure, and crash risk. The earlier literature on earnings guidance 
typically considers firms that provide more guidance to be more transparent. Recent literature, 
however, focuses on how managers use earnings guidance opportunistically (that is, in a self-
serving way) within an agency theory framework. Related literature has also highlighted 
investors’ concerns about the credibility of earnings guidance because of the voluntary, non-
audited nature of such guidance. Hence, how earnings guidance is, on average, related to stock 
price crash risk seems to be an empirical question. 
We find that more earnings guidance is associated with a higher likelihood of future stock 
price crash and the economic significance of the guidance effect is comparable to the effect of 
financial reporting opacity documented by HMT. Our identification strategies to deal with 
endogeneity indicate that the link between guidance and stock price crash risk is causal: that is, 
more guidance increases the stock price crash risk. While the finding of a positive association 
between more earnings guidance and the stock price crash risk might appear surprising, further 
analyses point to one explanation: agency problems associated with earnings guidance. In 
particular, we find that the positive association between guidance and crash risk is more 30 
 
pronounced when firms have higher executive stock ownership, but it is attenuated when there is 
higher analyst coverage or higher litigation risk. Earnings guidance that are associated with 
crashes tend to be over-optimistic and accompanied by reporting opacity.  
A key implication of our paper is that it is important to recognize the agency problems in 
both mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosures; HMT provides evidence of the former, 
whereas we provide evidence of the latter. In particular, when managers are given the 
opportunity to distort a disclosure, it is obvious that especially when incentives are high and/or 
monitoring is weak, some will do so in the hope that market participants will be unable to 
completely unravel the distortions. Just like earnings management exists with mandatory and 
audited financial reports, it might not be surprising that opportunistic use of voluntary and non-
audited guidance also exists. In fact, many studies in the management forecast literature have 
documented credibility concerns with and opportunistic uses of management forecasts. To 
address the potential financial instability arising from frequent earnings guidance, it might be 
useful to reduce the pressure on managers to provide frequent management forecasts, to make it 
more costly for managers to lie (e.g., by increasing the managers’ litigation exposure), and to 
increase investor awareness of the existence and consequences of the distortions.  
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our findings do not suggest that the effects of 
guidance are always negative in any setting. Our results indicate that, on average, more frequent 
earnings guidance is associated with higher crash risk, which, in itself, is only one of many 
possible capital market consequences. However, we examine the relation between guidance and 
crash risk because stock price crashes are significant economic events and, more importantly, are 
likely associated with considerable agency problems. By further showing the significant cross-
sectional and time-series variations in the association between guidance frequency and crash risk, 31 
 
our study highlights that agency issues in voluntary disclosure could lead to an increased 
likelihood of stock market crashes. While the notion that agency problems can lead to voluntary 
disclosure problems is not new, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to document 
the effects in terms of stock price crashes. We believe that such evidence is important given 
HMT’s findings on financial reporting opacity, the significant tension in the hypothesis about the 
relation between guidance and stock price crash, as well as the typical view that more disclosure 
equates to higher quality disclosure. Our results could also be informative to regulators and 
practitioners.  32 
 
Appendix 1   
Variable definitions 
Outcomes (t+1)   
Crash  A crash in stock price is measured following HMT. Specifically, for each 
firm-year observation, if there are at least 26 weekly stock returns in the 
following fiscal year (i.e., year t+1), we estimate the following firm-
specific regression:  
ri,w = β0 + β1 rmkt,w-1 + β2 rmkt,w + β3 rmkt,w+1 + β4 rind,w-1 + β5 rind,w + β6 rind,w+1 
+  εi,w,  where  ri,w  is the current weekly return for firm i;  rmkt,w ( rmkt,w-1, 
rmkt,w+1) is the weekly market return in the current (prior, next) week; and 
rind,w (rind,w-1, rind,w+1) is the weekly industry return in the current (prior, 
next) week.
13 We then compute Wi,w, the natural logarithm of one plus the 
residual return, εi,w, from the regression; Crash  is a dummy variable 
equaling one if, in year t+1, there is at least one extremely low Wi,w, which 
is defined as a Wi,w smaller than [Mean (Wi,w) - 3.09 × Std Dev (Wi,w)], and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Jump  Jump in stock price is measured following HMT. Similar to the calculation 
of Crash, Jump is a dummy variable equaling one if, in year t+1, there is at 
least one extremely high Wi,w, which is defined as a Wi,w greater than [Mean 
(Wi,w) + 3.09 × Std Dev (Wi,w)], and zero otherwise. 
  
Disclosure variables (t) 
Forecast  Number of annual earnings forecasts issued over the course of the fiscal 
year t. 
Opacity  Opacity measured following HMT. 
Opacity
2  Square of Opacity. 
Accruals_quality  Accruals quality measured following Francis et al. (2005). 
Accruals_quality
2  Square of Accruals_quality. 
   
Control variables (t) 
ROE  Return-on-assets. 
Size  Natural logarithm of market value of equity at fiscal year end. 
Market-to-Book  Ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity at fiscal year 
end. 
Leverage  Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Abn_Accruals  Abnormal accruals measured using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model 
by industry. 
Business_segments  Number of business segments in which the firm operates. 
                                                 
13 The weekly stock (market) returns are computed using the daily stock (value-weighted market) returns from 
CRSP. The weekly value-weighted Fama-French industry returns are computed using the daily industry returns 
available from Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 33 
 
Mean_return  Average of weekly returns. 
Std_return  Standard deviation of weekly returns. 
Analyst  Number of analysts issuing one-year-ahead EPS forecasts at the end of fiscal 
year t. 
Insider_trading  Shares traded by insiders as a percentage of the total shares outstanding. 
Crash_currfyr  Dummy variables equaling one if firms had at least one crash in fiscal year t.
   
Instrumental variable (t) 
RegFD  Dummy variable equaling one if fiscal year t is after the effective date of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (i.e., October 2000), zero otherwise. 
   
Other forecast characteristics (t) 
Up_bias  Dummy variable equaling one if on average, the management forecasts are 
upward biased; management forecast bias is measured as management 
forecast minus actual earnings, scaled by stock price on the day before the 
forecast. 
Forecast_currfyr  Number of annual year t-1 earnings forecasts issued and realized in fiscal 
year t.  
Analyst_optimism  The analyst forecast consensus mean EPS at the end of the fiscal year minus 
the actual EPS for fiscal year t, scaled by price. 
Forecaster  Dummy variable equaling one if a firm issued at least one annual earnings 
forecast in fiscal year t. 
   
Partitioning variables (t) 
CEO_own  Dummy variable equaling one if the beginning-of-the-year percentage of 
shares owned by the CEO is above the median for the year, zero otherwise.  
Lit_risk   Lit_Risk is a measure of litigation risk estimated from the probit model by 
Kim and Skinner (2011): 
Suedt =β0 + β1 Lit_industryt + β2 Lnasetst-1 + β3 SalesGrowtht-1 + β4 Returnt-
1+β5 ReturnSkewnesst-1+β6 ReturnStdt-1+β7 Turnovert-1+ ε t,                              
where Sued is a dummy variable indicating whether a class action lawsuit 
was filed against the firm during the fiscal year. Lawsuits are retrieved from 
the Stanford Litigation Database; any IPO, mutual fund, or analyst-related 
cases are excluded. Lit_Industry is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm is in the biotech, computer, electronics, or retail industry. LnAssets is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. SalesGrowth is the change in annual 
sales deflated by lagged total assets. Return is the market-adjusted annual 
return. ReturnSkewness is the skewness of the firms’ 12-month returns. 
ReturnStd is the standard deviation of the firm’s 12-month returns. Turnover 
is the annual trading volume deflated by the beginning-of-the-year 
outstanding shares. Lit_Risk is the predicted value from the probit 
regression.  
SOX  Dummy variable equaling one if the year is 2002 or later, zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1  







Forecastt: the number of 
annual earnings forecasts 
made in fiscal year t, for 
fiscal year t, t+1, t+2, ….. 
Crasht+1: a dummy variable 
equaling one if a firm 
experiences at least one 
crash in fiscal year t+1. 
Opacityt: HMT’s opacity 
measure as of the end of 
fiscal year t  
fiscal year t  fiscal year t+1 41 
 
Table 1  
Sample description 
 
This table presents descriptive information about the sample. Panel A presents the distribution of firms across the years for the 
sample period from 1997 to 2009. Panel B presents information about the weeks with extremely negative stock returns. These 
weekly returns are used to construct the key variable in our analysis, Crash, which is a dummy variable equaling one if a firm has 
at least one extremely negative weekly stock return in the year. Panel C presents a univariate analysis of the relation between a 
stock price crash and guidance. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of firms 
Year Number  of  firms 
Number of firms with  Percentage of firms with 
at least one forecast  at least one forecast 
1997 3,943  56  1.42% 
1998 3,863  129  3.34% 
1999 3,811  187  4.91% 
2000 3,651  228  6.24% 
2001 3,466  456  13.16% 
2002 3,412  632  18.52% 
2003 3,408  706  20.72% 
2004 3,288  783  23.81% 
2005 3,079  714  23.19% 
2006 2,930  751  25.63% 
2007 2,804  744  26.53% 
2008 2,705  732  27.06% 
2009 2,646  608  22.98% 







Panel B: Guidance and stock price crash risk  
Type of guidance in year t  Percentage of firm-years with at least one weekly stock 
price crash in year t + 1 (i.e., firms with Crash = 1) 
No guidance   18.51% 
Low frequency  23.19% 
High frequency  25.60% 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the study. The definitions of the variables are 
provided in the appendix. 
 
Variable N  Mean  Std  Dev  P25  Median  P75 
  
Crash  43,006  0.197 0.398 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Disclosure variables 
Forecast  43,006 0.738 1.806 0.000 0.000  0.000
Opacity  43,006  0.237 0.317 0.100 0.172 0.294 
Accruals_quality  24,890  0.047 0.038 0.021 0.036 0.061 
  
Control variables    
ROE  43,006  -0.284 44.855 -0.063  0.077  0.153 
Size  43,006  5.599 2.178 3.986 5.553 7.076 
Market-to-book  43,006  3.371 59.813 1.119  1.882  3.290 
Leverage  43,006  0.225 0.312 0.021 0.177 0.348 
Abn_accruals  43,006  0.005 0.184 -0.030 0.016 0.060 
Business_segments  43,006  5.260 4.363 3.000 3.000 9.000 
Mean_return  43,006  0.003 0.012 -0.003 0.003 0.009 
Std_return  43,006  0.081 0.051 0.048 0.069 0.100 
Insider_trading  43,006  0.778 3.842 0.000 0.021 0.442 
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Table 3  
Stock price crash and management forecast frequency 
 
This table presents the relation between stock price crash and management forecast frequency. The definitions of the 
variables are provided in Appendix 1. Year dummies are included in all the regressions but their coefficients are not 
tabulated. The standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. The t-statistic for each coefficient is provided in 
parentheses below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The economic effect is the expected change in the crash 
risk resulting from an increase in each independent variable from the 25th to the 75th percentiles in the sample 
distribution. 
 
      Crash     Economic 
Effect 
Intercept     -1.188***  -1.280*** 
   (-19.81) (-20.86) 
ROE     0.000 0.001  0.00% 
   (0.85) (1.21) 
Size     0.037*** 0.042***  3.08% 
   (4.53) (4.98) 
Market-to-book     0.000 0.001***  0.01% 
   (1.23) (3.00) 
Leverage     0.010 -0.002  0.09% 
   (0.35) (-0.04) 
Abn_accruals     0.070 0.101  0.17% 
   (0.97) (1.05) 
Business_segments     -0.007*** -0.007***  -1.14% 
   (-3.93) (-2.74) 
Mean_return     2.987*** 3.940***  0.96% 
   (3.11) (3.49) 
Std_return     -0.741*** -1.073***  -1.08% 
   (-3.05) (-3.37) 
Insider_trading    0.003* 0.007**  0.03% 
   (1.70) (2.15) 
Opacity     0.188** 0.79% 
   (2.51) 
Opacity
2     -0.101** 
   (-2.12) 
Accruals_quality     2.804*** 
   (3.69) 
Accruals_quality
2     -10.920** 
   (-2.45) 
Forecast     0.018*** 0.019***  0.50% 
   (4.24) (4.05) 






Table 4  
Stock price crash and management forecast frequency – instrumental variable approach 
 
This table presents the relation between a stock price crash and management forecast frequency estimated using a 
probit model with a continuous endogenous regressor (Newey 1987; Foster 1997). We employ RegFd as an 
instrumental variable for Forecast. The definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. Year dummies are 
included in all the regressions but their coefficients are not tabulated. The standard errors are clustered by firm and 
by year. The t-statistic for each coefficient is provided in parentheses below the coefficient. Significance levels are 
based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
      1st stage     2nd stage    
  
Intercept    -1.078***  -0.831*** 
   (-16.53) (-18.56) 
ROE     0.000 0.000 
   (0.90) (0.92) 
Size     0.250*** -0.017** 
   (23.18) (-2.38) 
Market-to-book     -0.000 0.000 
   (-1.37) (1.49) 
Leverage     0.083** -0.010 
   (2.22) (-0.34) 
Abn_accruals     -0.013 0.068 
   (-0.40) (1.19) 
Business_segments     0.022*** -0.010*** 
   (4.16) (-4.56) 
Mean_return     -6.841*** 4.120*** 
   (-12.15) (6.78) 
Std_return     -0.568*** -0.714*** 
   (-2.95) (-3.98) 
Insider_trading     0.002 0.003 
   (0.84) (1.52) 
Opacity     -0.328*** 0.230*** 
   (-7.26) (3.24) 
Opacity
2    0.011*** -0.088* 
   (7.07) (-1.69) 
RegFD     0.663*** 
   (28.37) 
Forecast     0.220*** 
   (10.89) 
Observations     43,006     43,006    
 R-square (%)     16.72%          
    45 
 
Table 5  
Stock price crash and management forecast frequency – agency problems 
 
This table examines how the relation between a stock price crash and management forecast frequency varies cross-
sectionally with various proxies of agency problems CEO ownership, external monitoring, litigation risk, SOX, 
opaque reporting, and forecast biases. The definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. All the control 
variables in Table 3, intercepts, and year dummies are used in all the regressions but not tabulated for parsimony. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. The t-statistic for each coefficient is provided in parentheses 
below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
   Crash 
Forecast  0.006 0.046***  0.054***  0.057***  0.009*  0.000 
(0.78) (3.20) (5.41) (3.99)  (1.80) (0.03) 
CEO_own  -0.068** 
(-2.20) 
Forecast x CEO_own  0.038*** 
(3.19) 
Analyst     0.144*** 
   (6.13) 
Institution_own     0.148*** 
   (8.92) 
Forecast × Analyst     -0.036** 
   (-2.40) 
Forecast × Institution_own     0.000 
   (0.00) 
Lit_risk     0.133*** 
   (6.60) 
Forecast × Lit_risk     -0.045*** 
   (-3.59) 
SOX     0.120** 
   (2.27) 
Opacity × SOX     -0.078 
      (-1.08) 
Forecast × SOX     -0.041*** 
      (-2.70) 
Forecast × Opacity     0.028*** 
   (3.01) 
Up_bias     0.032 
   (0.52) 
Forecast × Up_bias     0.026* 
   (1.66) 









Table 6  
Sensitivity tests 
 
This table examines how current period crashes, forecast horizons, analyst forecast bias, and the use of an alternative 
measure of forecast affect our main finings. The definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. Year 
dummies are included in all the regressions but their coefficients are not tabulated. The standard errors are clustered 
by firm and by year. The t-statistic for each coefficient is provided in parentheses below the coefficient. Significance 
levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
   Crash     Jump 
Intercept -1.194***  -1.188***  -1.104***  -1.187***  -0.116** 
(-15.81) (-20.10) (-17.14)  (-19.82)  (-1.96) 
ROE  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  -0.000 
(0.79) (0.85) (0.98)  (0.85)  (-0.62) 
Size  0.034*** 0.036***  0.022**  0.036***  -0.107*** 
(3.32) (4.56) (2.46)  (4.45)  (-13.04) 
Market-to-book  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  -0.000 
(1.18) (1.23) (1.19)  (1.23)  (-0.88) 
Leverage  0.012 0.010  -0.070** 0.010  0.030 
(0.38) (0.35) (-2.27)  (0.36)  (1.05) 
Abn_accruals  0.135* 0.070  0.197**  0.068  -0.018 
(1.87) (0.97) (2.37)  (0.95)  (-0.56) 
Business_segments  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005***  -0.007***  -0.001 
(-3.36) (-3.90) (-2.72)  (-3.96)  (-0.51) 
Mean_return  3.105*** 2.986*** 4.082***  3.017***  -4.803*** 
(3.04) (3.10) (4.28)  (3.14)  (-5.42) 
Std_return  -0.834*** -0.741***  -0.431  -0.735***  0.544*** 
(-2.61) (-3.05) (-1.23)  (-2.99)  (2.59) 
Insider_trading  0.005** 0.003*  0.005***  0.003*  -0.001 
(2.08) (1.70) (3.09)  (1.69)  (-0.26) 
Opacity  0.224** 0.188** 0.261**  0.190***  0.008 
(2.25) (2.52) (2.17)  (2.58)  (0.18) 
Opacity
2  -0.127* -0.101**  -0.128  -0.101**  0.001 
(-1.82) (-2.11) (-1.38)  (-2.13)  (1.04) 
Forecast  0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018***  0.009 
(3.44) (4.03) (4.05)  (1.51) 
Crash_currfyr  0.127*** 
(5.55) 
Forecast_currfyr     -0.006 
   (-0.12) 
Analyst_optimism     -0.010 
   (-0.62) 
Forecaster     0.107*** 
   (4.62) 
Observations 33,128  43,006  30,780  43,006      43,006 
 
 